












Department of Economics 
























1. Department of Social Sciences, Wageningen University  
2. Environmental Economics and Natural Resources Group, Wageningen University  
3. Institute of Forest Economics, Georg-August-University, Göttingen  
4 Department of Economics, University of Victoria 
   ii
REPA Working Papers:  
 
2003-01 – Compensation for Wildlife Damage: Habitat Conversion, Species Preservation and Local         
    Welfare (Rondeau & Bulte) 
2003-02 – Demand for Wildlife Hunting in British Columbia (Sun, van Kooten, & Voss) 
2003-03 – Does Inclusion of Landowners’ Non-Market Values Lower Costs of Creating Carbon 
 Forest Sinks? (Shaikh, Suchánek, Sun, and van Kooten) 
2003-04 – Smoke and Mirrors: The Kyoto Protocol and Beyond (van Kooten) 
2003-05 – Creating Carbon Offsets in Agriculture through No-Till Cultivation: A Meta-Analysis 
 of Costs and Carbon Benefits (Manley, van Kooten, Moeltner, and Johnson) 
2003-06 – Climate Change and Forest Ecosystem Sinks: Economic Analysis (van Kooten 
 and Eagle) 
2003-07 – Resolving Range Conflict in Nevada? The Potential for Compensation via 
    Monetary Payouts and Grazing Alternatives (Hobby and van Kooten) 
2003-08 – Social Dilemmas and Public Range Management: Results from the Nevada 
    Ranch Survey (van Kooten, Thomsen, Hobby, and Eagle) 
2004-01 – How Costly are Carbon Offsets? A Meta-Analysis of Forest Carbon Sinks (van 
    Kooten, Eagle, Manley, and Smolak) 
2004-02 – Managing Forests for Multiple Tradeoffs: Compromising on Timber, Carbon and              
Biodiversity Objectives (Krcmar, van Kooten, and Vertinsky) 
2004-03 – Tests of the EKC Hypothesis using CO2 Panel Data (Shi) 
2004-04 – Are Log Markets Competitive? Empirical Evidence and Implications for Canada-U.S.    
Trade in Softwood Lumber (Niquidet and van Kooten) 
2004-05 – Conservation Payments under Risk: A Stochastic Dominance Approach (Benítez,   









For copies of this or other REPA working papers contact: 
 
REPA Research Group  
Department of Economics  
University of Victoria PO Box 1700 STN CSC Victoria, BC V8W 2Y2 CANADA  
Ph: 250.472.4415  




This working paper is made available by the Resource Economics and Policy Analysis (REPA) 
Research Group at the University of Victoria. REPA working papers have not been peer reviewed 
and contain preliminary research findings. They shall not be cited without the expressed written 
consent of the author(s). Conservation Payments under Risk: A Stochastic Dominance Approach 
Abstract 
Conservation payments can be used to preserve forest and agroforest systems in developing 
countries. To explain landowners’ land-use decisions and determine the appropriate 
conservation payments, it is necessary to focus on risk associated with agricultural price and 
yield volatility. A theoretical framework is provided for assessing land-use allocation problems 
under risk and setting risk-efficient conservation payments when returns are not necessary 
normally distributed. Stochastic dominance rules are used to derive conditions for determining 
the conservation payments required to guarantee that the environmentally-preferred land use 
dominates, even when land uses are not considered to be mutually exclusive. An empirical 
application to shaded-coffee protection in the biologically important El Chocó region of West 
Ecuador shows that conservation payments required for preserving shaded-coffee areas are 
much higher than those calculated under the assumption of risk-neutrality. Further, the extant 
distribution of land has a strong impact on the required conservation payments. 
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systems, portfolio diversification.  
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  3Introduction 
Forests and agroforest systems produce a variety of global benefits, including carbon uptake 
and biodiversity services. Without payments for these services, forestry might not be an 
attractive land use for private owners. This is certainly true for shaded coffee in West Ecuador, 
where cultivated area has been reduced at the expense of temporary crops and pasture. 
Conversion of shaded-coffee lands to annual crops and/or pasture releases stored carbon to the 
atmosphere and reduces biodiversity. International payments for carbon storage or biodiversity 
conservation may help prevent land conversion.  
A variety of economic models have been used to evaluate the effect of land-use policies 
that enhance the environmental services from forests. Econometric approaches have provided 
insights into the aggregated impact of carbon uptake and conservation policies (Stavins; 
Deininger and Minten; Plantinga, Mauldin and Miller; Plantinga, Alig and Cheng); general 
equilibrium models have been used for predicting changes due to environmental payments 
(Callaway and McCarl); and optimal control models have strengthened knowledge concerning 
mitigation of climate change through forestry (Sohngen and Mendelsohn 1998, 2003; van 
Kooten). The evaluation of conservation policies rarely takes into account risk, a factor that is 
often decisive in allocating land uses (Collender and Zilberman; Just and Pope). Here we focus 
on the landowner’s allocation problem under risk and evaluate how risk-efficient conservation 
policies could be implemented for maintaining existing shaded-coffee areas in West Ecuador.  
Mean-variance (MV) analysis is a classical approach to risk management (Markowitz). 
Widely used in the financial world, its application is limited to situations where returns are 
normally distributed or the decision-maker’s utility function is quadratic, conditions not always 
met when considering forests and other natural resource assets (Heikkinen and Kuosmanen). MV also fails to show dominance in cases where almost every farmer would prefer one land 
use over another (Leshno and Levy). Suppose that a landowner is to choose between land uses 
A and B, where σA > σB. No matter how much greater E(A) is than E(B), the MV approach is 
unable to tell us that A is unambiguously better than B. It is unable to recommend a (risk-free) 
conservation payment that would make the landowner choose land use A over B.  
An alternative to MV analysis is the more general choice rule based on stochastic 
dominance (SD). This technique sets minimum restrictions on landowners’ utility functions 
and is valid for all types of return distributions. While stochastic dominance had been limited 
in its applicability for solving portfolio problems with diverse options, recent advances have 
extended possible applications (Shalit and Yitzhaki; Kuosmanen; Post).
1 In this study, we use 
SD for situations with and without diversification possibilities, in contrast to traditional SD 
studies where diversification has not being considered (Harris and Mapp; Johnson and Cramb; 
Williams et al.). We also extend the SD literature on first- and second-order marginal 
conditional SD and apply the framework to land use in a developing country. 
We begin our investigation with a brief review of stochastic dominance rules. We then 
provide a theoretical framework for the determination of risk-efficient conservation payments 
under different stochastic dominance criteria. The theoretical model is applied to a West 
Ecuador case study. The study area is described, relevant data are provided and major findings 
of the empirical application are discussed. Some conclusions follow.  
Stochastic Dominance Rules  
Assume that a landowner must decide whether to invest in forestry/agroforestry,  f, or an 
alternative crop, g, with cumulative net revenue distribution functions given by F(x) and G(x), 
  2respectively. Forestry dominates the crop alternative by first-order stochastic dominance (FSD) 
iff, 
G(x) – F(x) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ R, with at least one strict inequality.  (1) 
The FSD criterion has an intuitive interpretation in terms of the von Neumann-Morgenstern 
expected utility theory: if one investment alternative dominates another, every non-satiated 
investor (with non-decreasing utility function, U′ ≥ 0) will prefer the dominant alternative. 
While this criterion seems reasonable, it is not very discerning. In practice, the cumulative 
distributions of net returns of the two investment alternatives often intersect, in which case 
FSD cannot discriminate between the alternatives.  
If investors are risk averse in addition to insatiable (i.e., U′′ ≤ 0 and U′ ≥ 0), second-
order stochastic dominance (SSD) could be used to choose between them. Formally, forestry 
dominates cropping in the SSD sense iff, 
() ( ) ( ) 0  R,  with at least one strict inequality 
x
Gz Fz d z x
−∞
−≥ ∀ ∈ ∫      (2) 
In words, SSD requires that the area under the cumulative density function for forestry is 
always smaller than the area under the cumulative density function for the crop. Every risk-
averse, non-satiable investor prefers the investment alternative that dominates by SSD. 
In empirical analysis, the probability distributions G and F are unknown and must be 
estimated from available data. Hence, we consider a finite, discrete sample of observations on 
returns in forestry and a crop alternative over T periods, which we interpret as states of nature. 
We assume the states are drawn randomly without replacement from a common pool of 
possible states. States are assumed to be identically and independently distributed such that 
each observed state is equally likely to occur in any period, and the occurrence of a state in one 
period does not influence the probability distribution in any other period.  
  3Standard algorithms for identifying stochastic dominance utilize pair-wise comparisons 
of sorted series of net revenue distributions (Levy 1992, 1998). Denote original time series of 
net revenues from forestry and cropping by yf and yg, respectively, and the vectors of the re-
arranged series sorted in ascending order by xf and xg. Index t is used to indicate elements of 
the original series vector, while i indicates elements of the sorted series vector. From the sorted 
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Following the same procedure, we get xg′. We now express the empirical SD rules as follows 
(Levy 1992): 
FSD: Forestry dominates cropping iff xf,i ≥  xg,i ∀i =1,….,T     (4) 
SSD: Forestry dominates cropping iff x´f,i ≥  x´g,i ∀i =1,….,T    (5) 
with at least one strict inequality holding in both cases.  
  The pair-wise comparisons of empirical revenue distributions apply to situations where 
land-use alternatives are mutually exclusive. If the land can be freely proportioned to smaller 
plots such that different crops are simultaneously cultivated in these plots, the rules based on 
pair-wise comparisons fail to account for the infinite number of different land-use portfolios. 
The case of non-exclusive land uses can be seen as example of portfolio diversification. Like 
any investor, the land owner can hedge the overall risk of the land portfolio by diversifying 
into different uses so that return fluctuations in different crops can at least partially cancel out.  
Using portfolio weights w = (wf, wg) for forestry and cropping, the revenue portfolios 
are represented by vector  . The key to empirical application of SD rules for 
portfolio analysis under portfolio diversification is to preserve the cross-sectional structure of 
revenues, because it is impossible to recover portfolio returns from the sorted revenue series; 
pf fg ww =+ yy g y
  4for example,  f fg g f fg wwww +≠+ yyx
p
w
g x  (see Kuosmanen). That is, we can always sort the 







Shalit and Yitzhaki and Post propose to sort all revenue series according to the portfolio 
returns  yp, such that portfolio returns are in ascending order. Denote the resulting sorted 
portfolio revenue series by x , and the revenue series for forestry and cropping, sorted 
according to the portfolio revenues, by   and  g
w x , respectively. While elements of x  are in 
ascending order, the elements of 
p
w
 and  g
w  are usually not. The rationale of sorting all series 
according to the portfolio returns is to guarantee that  pf fg ww g = + xxx .  
Following Shalit and Yitzhaki, we apply SD rules (4) and (5) to revenue series sorted 
according to the portfolio revenues rather than separately for each crop, to get the so-called 
marginal conditional stochastic dominance (MCSD) rules. Again, we form the cumulative sum 
vectors  f
′ w x  and  , as in (3). The first- and second-order marginal conditional stochastic 
dominance (FMCSD and SMCSD) rules are defined as follows (see Shalit and Yitzhaki):
2 
FMCSD: Forestry dominates cropping iff  ,, f ig i x x ≥
ww
,
 ∀i =1,….,T    (6) 
SMCSD: Forestry dominates cropping iff  , f ig i x x ′ ′ ≥
ww  ∀i =1,….,T      (7) 
with at least one strict inequality holding in both cases.  
Shalit and Yitzhaki show that if an asset (here forestry) dominates another asset (crop) 
by SMCSD, then every non-satiated risk averse investor (landowner) will be better off if the 
portfolio weight of the dominating asset is increased at the expense of the dominated one. One 
can verify that FMCSD implies that every non-satiated landowner (irrespective of risk 
  5preferences) will benefit from an increase in the portfolio weight of the dominating asset at the 
expense of the dominated one.  
Stochastic Dominance for Determining Conservation Payments 
Stochastic dominance provides a framework for estimating the conditions under which forestry 
is a risk-efficient land-use choice. Assume that forests are privately owned with well-
established property rights and that landowners have a basic set of common preferences: they 
maximize expected utility, their utility function is non-satiated and they are risk averse. Under 
these assumptions, second-order stochastic dominance is the appropriate decision tool for land-
use choice. In addition, we need to identify farms’ diversification possibilities. SD 
comparisons of unmixed alternatives might lead to wrong results when they are not mutually 
exclusive and the correlation coefficients of returns are below a certain threshold value 
(McCarl et al.). 
Empirical evidence of deforestation patterns indicates whether or not diversification 
exists on a farm. The typical case without diversification possibilities is seen in relatively small 
farms where fixed costs associated with different crops restrict them to be mutually exclusive. 
Diversification is seen in the more general situation where landowners divide their initial forest 
into parcels that are allocated for different uses. We evaluate both possibilities.  
Mutually exclusive land uses 
Consider the case where a forestland owner faces the possibility of investing in new crops 
where, given size limitations, she can only plant one crop at a time (land uses are mutually 
exclusive). Using SD analysis and pair-wise comparisons of forestry with the alternative land 
  6uses, three mutually exclusive situations that result in high to low deforestation can be 
distinguished:  
(A)  Forestry is not a risk-efficient land use, so at least one land use dominates forestry, and 
retaining forests is not an option. There is then a high chance that deforestation occurs.  
(B)  Forestry is a risk-efficient land use, but not the only one. Depending on preferences of 
individual landowners some farm-forests will be converted and others not.  
(C)  Forestry is the only risk-efficient land use – forestry dominates all other land uses. This 
guarantees keeping all existing forests (zero deforestation).  
Dominance among A, B and C can be influenced by a conservation payment, s. We determine 
minimal payments, smin, that guarantee that at least some landowners consider forestry as the 
optimal land use (limiting situations A and B), but payments below smin have no impact. Also, 
there will be a payment smax where all landowners find forestry the optimal land use (limiting 
situations B and C). Any payments above smax represent an inefficient use of financial 
resources. In order to find smin and smax under FSD, we recognize that the non-stochastic 
conservation payment shifts the cumulative distribution function of forestry returns to the right. 
Thus, each xf,i from forestry is now xf,i + s. Using FSD conditions (4), we get (with formal 
proof in Appendix I):  
FSD:     smin=mini(xg,i – xf,i) and smax=maxi(xg,i – xf,i).      (8) 
Similarly, using (5) we get for SSD (see Appendix I):  
SSD:    
min










  and 
max










   .    (9)
 
The level of payment for a risk-neutral landowner, for whom smax=smin=E(xg,i-xf,i), lies 
between the FSD limits. The upper and lower bounds in SD analysis emerge due to 
  7heterogeneity of landowners’ preferences. If all of them had the same utility function, we 
would have smax=smin based on direct expected utility analysis. If we know little about their 
utility function, as in FSD, we expect a broad range between smax and smin. Further knowledge 
of the utility function (e.g., U′′≤ 0, making SSD valid) narrows this payment range.
3  
The conditions for smin and smax could be extended to cases where more than one 
alternative land use exists. By comparing forestry with each of the alternative land uses, we 
obtain a single smax and smin for each comparison. The overall smax is the maximum of all the 
individual smax and the overall smin is the maximum of all the individual smin, where smin and smax 
are measures of the efficiency of land use f. Large values of smin represent land uses that are 
least risk efficient, while small values of smax represent risk-efficient land uses that nearly 
dominate all other land uses.  
Land uses with diversification possibilities 
The previous minimum and maximum bounds pertain to the case where all land is assigned to 
a single use. Applying the previous insights to the FMCSD criteria, we get the following 
minimum and maximum payments (see Appendix I): 
FMCSD:   smin =  ( , min ) , g if i i x x −
ww   and smax =  ( ) ,, max g if i i x x −
ww      (10) 































   (11) 
Note the similarity of these conditions with the ones for FSD and SSD, with the only 
difference that here the series are sorted according to portfolio revenues. The FMCSD 
(SMCSD) conditions give the minimum and maximum bounds for the conservation payment to 
  8guarantee that all non-satiated (and risk averse) landowners have no incentive (marginally) to 
increase the weight of cropping in the land portfolio. If there is only one alternative crop (g), 
these bounds fully exhaust the diversification options. However, if there are multiple 
alternative crops (say g and h), then the bounds should be constructed such that there is no 
portfolio of alternative crops that dominates forestry in the sense of MCSD.  
Since the current portfolio weights are denoted by w, we use vg and vh as the portfolio 
weights of crops g and h in the sub-portfolio that threatens to replace forestry as the land use. 
To take the diversification options fully into account, we need to solve the following max-min 
and max-max problems: 
 
FMCSD: 
() min , , , , max min ( )
g h
gg i hh i f i i vv sv x v x  =+ 
ww w x −  and  ( ) max , , , , max max ( )
g h
gg i hh i f i i vv sv x v x x   =+ −  
ww w (12) 
SMCSD:  
min , , , ,
1
max min ( )
g h
gg i hh i f i i vv sv x v x
i
  x ′ ′′ =+    
ww w −  and 
max , , , ,
1
max max ( )
g h
gg i hh i f i i vv sv x v x
i
  x   ′ ′′ =+    
ww w −        (13) 
 
subject to vg + vh = 1 and vg, vh ≥ 0. In practice, these bounds can be solved by using linear 
programming (LP), with the LPs provided in Appendix II.  
  9Case Study: Shaded-Coffee in West Ecuador 
The study area is in the province of Manabí, located in the tropical lowlands of west Ecuador. 
The natural vegetation is a continuation of the El Chocó, a bio-geographical region known as 
one of the world’s hotspots of biodiversity because of its species richness, high levels of 
endemism and stress from human activities (Myers et al.). Primary forests remain mostly in 
protected areas such as the Mache Chindul Reserve and the Machalilla National Park. 
Important areas of coffee plantations are found throughout Manabí, which constitutes one of 
the main areas for coffee production and where all coffee is produced under shade. While state 
and private actions increasingly protect primary forests, shaded-coffee systems that provide a 
buffer zone for biodiversity protection are being cleared. Government estimates suggest that 
coffee plantations have been reduced nationally by about 40% during the last decade (SICA).  
We consider four land uses: shaded-coffee, highland rice, maize, and pasture for dairy 
cows and cattle. Time series for estimating yearly revenues are available for 1967-2002 from 
several government offices in charge of agricultural statistics. For coffee, rice and maize yield, 
we have data for 1991-2002 (SICA) and 1967-1990 (MAG), respectively.
4 Since these series 
correspond to country-level yield data, we convert them to provincial yields based on factors 
obtained from the 2000 census (INEC, MAG and SICA). For dairy and cattle, we use the 
assumption of constant yield. This approximation is valid due to the extensive nature of cattle 
grazing, where weather variability has a small impact on annual cattle growth. Cattle yield is 
estimated using a method described in Benítez et al. For the stocking density of 1.1 head per 
hectare found in Manabí province, the estimated growth in cattle live weight yield is 93 kg per 
year, while a dairy cow in this region yields 2.6 liters of milk per day (INEC, MAG and SICA). 
Since 41% of the livestock herd consists of dairy cows and 40% of them produce milk, annual 
  10production is calculated to be 172 liters/ha.  
 Producer prices for crops are available for the periods 1991-2002 (SICA) and 1978-
1990 (Whitaker, Colyer and Alzamora). For the period 1967-1977, we estimate producer prices 
as a function of retail prices (INEC). In order to account for inflation and estimate net revenues 
in real terms, we convert prices into constant US$ for year 2000 based on Ecuador’s consumer 
price index. In 2000, the local currency (sucre) was officially eliminated and replaced by the 
US dollar. Prices before 2000 are first converted into constant (year 2000) sucre, and then 
transformed into US dollars using the 2000 exchange rate; dollar prices after 2000 are 
converted into constant US dollars using the CPI.  
Cost estimates are based on survey data from 2003. For coffee, costs include land 
preparation, planting, cleaning, pruning and shade control. Land preparation and planting costs 
are annualized using a discount rate of 5% and a period of 15 years.
5 For annual crops (maize 
and rice) costs include land preparation, seeds, planting, fertilizer, weeding and pest control. 
These costs are the same for all years except for seed costs, which depend on annual crop 
prices. Variable costs include harvest and transport costs. For cattle, costs include brush 
control, the opportunity costs of cattle stock, cattle losses, vaccines and pest control. The 
opportunity costs of cattle stock and costs associated with cattle losses also depend on annual 
(cattle) prices. General farm costs such as administration and fence maintenance are not 
included, since they have no influence on land-use choice. Based on this information, we 
estimate net revenues for each year as the product of price and yield minus costs. 
  11Revenue trends  
SD analysis is based on the assumption that each observed state of nature is equally likely to 
occur and that the probabilities do not change over time. This assumption is not valid if 
revenue follows a time trend, as is the case if crop yield (y) is a function of t: 
yt = a + bt + et.          ( 1 4 )  
Then E(yT) = a+bT, for example, in contrast to the assumption that returns are equally likely to 
occur. However, returns can be de-trended before determining the SD of a series. A series can 
be de-trended in various ways, including curve fitting, first differencing, digital filtering and 
piece-wise polynomials, but we employ the most common procedure of curve fitting. We first 
test for the existence of significant trends in the yields and prices of each of the four land uses 
by applying the @trend function of E-views to (14).
6 Results indicate that maize yields have a 
statistically significant (at the 0.05 level of significance) increasing trend and rice prices a 
decreasing trend. 
It is reasonable to expect that the increase in land productivity due to technological 
improvements (e.g., development of new seeds) has its limits and that yield growth should 
decrease over time. Nor can prices fall continuously. Therefore, a concave trend function (in 
our case logarithmic) is used. We test both a linear and logarithmic trend (see Table 1). 
Diagnostic tests of the residuals include White’s heteroskedasticity test, a BP test for 
autocorrelation, and the Jarque Bera test for normality. Based on R
2 and diagnostic tests of the 
residuals, we select a linear model for both rice and maize.
7 We de-trend the series by adding 
the residuals of the linear regression to the expected value of equation (14) at time T. Then we 
re-estimate net revenues for maize and rice. By coincidence, the series with trends confirm our 
normality assumption, although, for the general case of non-normality, more comprehensive 
methods like GMM could be used.  
  12Once the price and yield series are corrected for trend, we estimate net revenues. The 
descriptive statistics for the net revenue series, including the Jarque-Bera and Shapiro-Wilk 
tests for normality, are provided in Table 2. Non-normality is particularly evident for coffee 
and it is caused by both positive skewness and high kurtosis. This motivates the use of the SD 
approach, which is valid for any type of distribution.  
Bootstrapping 
Bootstrapping has been used to increase the power of empirical applications of stochastic 
dominance tests. One of the advantages is that bootstrapping smoothes the cumulative density 
function (CDF) in ways that mitigate problems associated with obtaining reliable estimates of 
order statistics (Nelson and Pope). In addition, it allows SD tests to be more discerning since it 
avoids inadvertent intersection of cumulative distributions.  
A simple bootstrapping algorithm based on Nelson and Pope is employed. We first re-
sample with replacement from the original empirical distribution function (EDF) and then find 
the average of each order statistic for computing a new EDF. The number of samples needs to 
be sufficiently large so that the resulting distribution will not be affected by additional re-
sampling. In Figure 1, we provide an indication of the effect that bootstrapping of the coffee 
series (with 1000 samples) has on the original EDF. Irregularities are eliminated and the 
bootstrapped distribution is assumed to be the appropriate one for estimating the risk efficient 
conservation payments under FSD and SSD.  
Results and Discussion 
We now estimate the risk-efficient conservation payments under conditions of mutually 
exclusive land uses alternatives and when full portfolio diversification is allowed.  
  13Mutually exclusive land uses 
The FSD efficient land-use alternatives can be determined by direct observation of the 
intersections of the (bootstrapped) EDFs of the different land uses (Figure 2). The EDF for 
maize is always to the right of that of rice, indicating that maize dominates rice by FSD. Since 
the EDFs for coffee, pasture and maize all intersect, the FSD efficient set contains these three 
land uses. To rank the other land uses requires further differentiation, which we do using SSD. 
Since maize dominates rice by FSD, it also dominates rice by SSD. Maize dominates 
coffee and coffee dominates rice by SSD, but there is no dominance relation between maize 
and pasture. Thus, the SSD efficient set consists of maize and pasture. These results explain 
some of the land-use choices in the study region. First, the conversion of existing shaded-
coffee areas can be explained by the result that this land use is inefficient (under SSD). Second, 
pasture is the dominant land use in the region even though its expected revenues are lower than 
those of other land uses (Table 2), but this is justified on the grounds that it is a risk-efficient 
land use, where the low expected revenues are compensated by smaller variation in revenue.  
  Finding the risk-efficient payment for conservation requires estimates of smin and smax 
that, in turn, depend on the alternative land-use opportunities. We calculate the minimum and 
maximum bounds required to make coffee a risk-efficient land-use alternative, comparing 
coffee returns separately with each alternative land use. The results are reported in Table 3. 
Since coffee is FSD efficient, the lower bound smin is equal to zero in the FSD case. The upper 
bound  smax varies annually between $2/ha and $55/ha.  In the SSD case, the minimum 
conservation payment is $30/ha (to break SSD dominance by maize). The maximum payment 
is $55/ha, which would suffice to guarantee that coffee dominates all other alternatives.  
These payments can be compared with those required under risk-neutrality, where only 
expected values matter. When the alternative to coffee is pasture, there is no need for a 
  14payment under risk-neutral conditions since the mean net return to coffee is higher than that for 
pasture. However, for all risk-averse landowners to prefer coffee over pasture requires a 
payment of $55/ha (based on SSD). Such a risk premium represents 70% of the (average) net 
revenues for coffee. These results stress the need for considering risk when implementing 
policy instruments aimed at conservation. Given the high variability of coffee revenues, it is 
risk and not expected values that discourages landowners. While provision of risk-free 
payments for protecting coffee areas is one strategy, a better one might be to incorporate risk-
hedging strategies and insurance possibilities for small farmers, instruments that are slowly 
being developed in Ecuador’s financial markets. 
Non-exclusive land uses 
The risk-efficient payment under MCSD depends on the current portfolio shares. We test this 
with an arbitrary, equally-weighted (50-50) portfolio of coffee and maize. To illustrate the 
concept of FMCSD, a plot of the portfolio (consisting of coffee 
w
f x  and maize  g
w x ) and 
component net revenues series is provided in Figure 3 (panel A). (The axes in the figure have 
been switched to provide a better illustration.) One land use dominates another under FMCSD 
if there is no intersection of the individual land-use curves. As shown in the figure, both curves 
intersect, so we conclude that there is no FMCSD between coffee and maize for such portfolio. 
In panel B, the cumulative series for determining SMCSD are provided. Since the series for 
maize are always above the ones of coffee, maize dominates coffee by SMCSD. We conclude 
that second-order dominance does exist. 
To obtain better estimates of the efficient conservation payments under the MCSD 
criteria, we interviewed 92 coffee producers, finding that 35% of them do not diversify their 
land use. The remainder employ different combinations of land uses that, on average, have the 
  15portfolio shares shown in Table 4. As in the case of no diversification, we estimate risk-
efficient conservation payments that prevent marginal conversions of shaded-coffee to other 
uses. These results are also summarized in Table 4, where smin and smax payments under 
FMCSD and SMCSD are provided.  
The results confirm the theoretical expectations. The level of a risk efficient payment 
depends on the given portfolio shares. The higher the share of coffee, the higher is the required 
conservation payment. In most of the portfolios analyzed, the payment smax under MCSD is 
higher than under SSD. Importantly, under SSD and SMCSD, the minimum payment smin is 
often the difference in expected net returns between coffee and maize. To understand this 
peculiarity, note that a payment smin requires breaking the dominance of maize over coffee. 
Since the distribution of coffee has a greater spread than that of maize, this dominance can 
only be broken by adding a payment that results in both land uses having the same mean. Then 
maize can never dominate coffee by SSD.  
Conclusions 
In this article, we extend theoretical contributions for analyzing stochastic dominance tests 
with fully diversifiable portfolios (Post; Kuosmanen; Shalit and Yitzhaki) by including a first-
order MCSD rule. We then apply the theory to the problem of identifying the magnitude of 
conservation payments needed to prevent land-use change that reduces biodiversity in 
developing countries. In particular, we introduce the concept of two efficiency measures for 
evaluating forestland use: (1) the minimum risk-free payment (smin) required to ensure that 
forestry is not dominated by any other land use; and (2) the minimum risk-free payment (smax) 
guaranteeing that forestry dominates all other land uses. Large values of smin represent land 
uses that are least risk-efficient, while small values of smax represent risk-efficient land uses 
  16that nearly dominate all other land uses. Knowledge of smin and smax helps to identify 
intervention strategies – payments for conservation – that can be implemented efficiently.  
The methodology is applied to a West Ecuador case study, where shaded-coffee is 
compared with the most important alternative land uses in the region. Results indicate that (1) 
shaded-coffee is not a risk-efficient land use, no matter whether diversification is possible or 
not, which goes a long way towards explaining current land uses. (2) The payments required to 
preserve shaded-coffee areas are much higher than the compensation payments calculated 
under the assumption of risk-neutrality. (3) The extant distribution of land uses has a strong 
impact on the required conservation payment. (4) Land-use policy interventions need to 
incorporate risk-hedging strategies and insurance possibilities for small farmers, instruments 
that are slowly developing in Ecuador’s financial markets. 
Finally, the method for estimating risk-efficient conservation payments presented in 
this article could also be used to derive cost curves for environmental services. This may be 
particularly apt in the case of carbon sequestration as the Kyoto Protocol allows trading carbon 
offsets from forestry and agricultural activities. To derive a carbon uptake cost curve, it is 
necessary to first define a wide range of possible portfolios and then estimate the carbon level 
for each portfolio. The higher the share of shaded-coffee, the higher is the amount of carbon 
that is sequestered. For each portfolio, there is a corresponding level of compensation (or 
carbon uptake costs), and that information can be used to estimate a supply curve for carbon 
uptake services. The methodology can be used to examine portfolio diversification in the 
energy sector, where nuclear, renewable and fossil-fuel sources of energy are possible and 
portfolio shares are influenced by carbon taxes. These are areas of future research. 
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  21Appendix I 
 
Let f and g be two land uses with sorted net revenues series xf,i and xg,i, respectively. We have 
the following propositions: 
Proposition 1a. The payment level that guarantees first-order stochastic dominance of f over g 
is s = Maxi(xg,i – xf,i). 
Proof. Denote by f* the net revenue series of f that includes the conservation payment. FSD 
requires that xf*,i ≥ xg,i, ∀i. Since we know that net revenues of f* equal f plus a non-stochastic 
payment (s), we have xf*,i = xf,i +s. Replacing this in the previous expression yields xf,i + s ≥ 
xg,i, ∀i. Thus, s ≥ xg,i – xf,i, ∀i. Since this should hold for every pair-wise comparison on i, the 
payment needs to be at least as large as the maximum of the differences between xg,i and xf,i, or 
s = Maxi(xg,i – xf,i). 
Proposition 1b. The payment level that guarantees that f will not be dominated by g by FSD is 
s = Mini(xg,i – xf,i). 
Proof. If f is not to be dominated by g, we require, for at least one pair-wise comparison, that 
. This requires that  i g x x i i f , *, ≥ ∋ ∃ i f i g x x s i , , − ≥ ∋ ∃ . If this holds for one pair-wise comparison, f 
will not be dominated by g by FSD. Thus, s = Mini(xg,i – xf,i). 
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Proof. SSD requires that x´f*,i ≥ x’g,i, ∀i. If we add a non-stochastic payment (s) for land use f, 
we get the cumulative sorted series for f*: . 
Replacing the latter expression in the former gives x´
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f,i + i·s ≥ x’g,i, and s ≥ (x’g,i – x´f,i)/i, ∀i. 
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  22Proposition 2b. The payment level that guarantees that f would not be dominated by g in 
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Proof. The proof follows the same reasoning as for 1b and 2a. Since we just need one i where  
s ≥ (x’g,i – x´f,i)/i holds, the minimum of the differences is enough. 
The proofs for the smin and smax conditions in the cases of FMCSD and SMCSD follow 
the same line of reasoning as in the preceding propositions, but use the series sorted according 
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Since  σ  is constrained to be less than or equal to the objective of the original max-min 
problem ∀ i = 1,…,T, and since at least one of the inequalities must be binding in the optimal 
solution,  σ  represents the minimum bound. Thus, setting portfolio weights vg and vh to 
maximize σ  will give the solution to the max-min problem. 
The objective function for the max-max problem is linear, so the LP solution gives the 
extreme values vg =1 and vh =0, or vice versa. Thus, the maximum bound (smax) is calculated in 
two steps. First, make a pair-wise comparison between forest and all other crops and find smax 
for each comparison, following equations (10) and (11). Then, choose the larger smax. 









J. Bera test, 
p-value 
Rice_price       
 Linear trend  0.407  0.376  0.08  0.069 
 Logarithm trend  0.278  0.611  0.01*  0.173 
Maize yield       
 Linear trend  0.658  0.00004*  0.2  0.394 
 Logarithm trend  0.492  0.034*  0.0048*  0.01* 
*Significant with 5% confidence level 
  24Table 2. Summary Statistics for Net Revenues Series of Land-use Systems in Manabí, 
1967-2002.  
 Coffee  Maize*  Rice*  Pasture 
Mean ( 2000 US$/ha)  78  108  57  53 
Standard Deviation (2000 US$/ha)  86  56  61  18 
Skewness 1.6  0.5  0.7  0.7 
Kurtosis 6.5  3.5  2.8  2.3 
Jarque-Bera p-value  0.000  0.4  0.2  0.2 
Shapiro-Wilk. p-value  0.01  0.5  .07  0.01 
* De-trended series 
  25Table 3. Minimum and Maximum Conservation Payments Required to make Coffee a 
Risk-efficient Land Use (Year 2000 US$ per ha) 
Land use alternative to coffee 
Maize Rice  Pasture 
Decision criteria 
smin s max s min s max s min s max 
FSD 0  53  0  2  0  55 
SSD 30  48  0  0  0  55 
Difference in means 
(Risk neutrality assumption) 
30 30  0  0  0  0 
Note: A value of zero is assigned when the estimated payment is negative.  
  26Table 4. Required Payments for Shaded-Coffee Conservation based on Responses from 




Land-use shares of representative farms 
smin s max s min s max 
Farms with two land-uses        
Coffee: 56%; Pasture: 44%  0  77  0  73 
Coffee:55%; Rice:45%  0  107  0  46 
Coffee: 79%; Maize: 21%  0  204  30  104 
Farms with three land-uses        
Coffee: 36%; Rice: 11%; Pasture: 53%  0  107  0  74 
Coffee: 47%; Maize: 15%; Pasture: 38%   0  204  30  104 
Coffee: 68%; Maize: 20%; Rice: 12%  0  204  30  104 
Farms with four land-uses        
Coffee: 34%; Maize: 6%; Rice:9%; Pasture: 51%  0  204  30  111 
Note: A value of zero is assigned when the estimated payment is negative.  
 
  27 
Figure 1. Original and Bootstrapped EDFs for Coffee 
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Figure 2. Bootstrapped EDFs for Major Land Uses in West Ecuador 
 
 



































































































Figure 3. Graphical illustration of FMCSD (panel A) and SMCSD (panel B) 
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Notes 
1 Levy and Kroll extended the SD rules for investment choice between two risky assets by 
combining them with a risk-free asset. Shalit and Yitzhaki developed the so-called marginal 
conditional stochastic dominance rule, which tests if a marginal increase in the portfolio weight 
of one asset at the expense of another results in a dominating portfolio. The Shalit-Yitzhaki 
rule offers a necessary but not sufficient condition for portfolio efficiency. Kuosmanen 
presented the first necessary and sufficient test for portfolio efficiency. This approach has 
subsequently been further developed by Post. 
2 Shalit and Yitzhaki only consider the second-order MCSD rule. The first-order MCSD rule is 
an innovation made here. 
3 With data on risk aversion parameters, more discerning extensions of SD could be used to 
determine narrower bounds for s. For example, knowledge of the risk aversion range permits 
using stochastic dominance with respect to a function (see Williams et al.), while excluding 
extreme utility functions permits using almost stochastic dominance (Leshno and Levy). 
4 Data sources are from different publications, but most of the primary data on crop yield and 
prices were collected by the Dirección de Información Agropecuaria of the Agricultural 
Ministry. This work has been complemented in the last few years by the World Bank’s SICA 
project, which attempts to improve information management and dissemination. 
5 Coffee has existed on some parcels for up to 80 years, although they have been renewed 
periodically.  
6 Testing yield and price separately is adequate given the small correlation between both series 
in the case of rice, maize and pasture. For coffee, there is some correlation between price and 
yield (correlation coefficient is 0.16), so we also tested the net revenue trends.   32
 
7 For maize yield heteroskedasticity is ignored, which suggests that a more complex trend 
model might be more appropriate. However, we retain the linear model because of its 
simplicity and relatively high R
2, and to be consistent with the other series.  